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 This study aims to examine the effect of debt covenant slack on the value 
relevance of accounting information, and whether earnings management 
works as an intervening variable. A total of 40 non-financial companies listed 
in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2017 were selected as sample. 
Three hypotheses were tested using partial least square and analyzed via path 
analysis. This study found that debt covenant slack positively affects the value 
relevance of accounting information. Possibly, the tendency of small debt 
covenant slacks in the firms causing the information of firms’ performance to 
be less relevant for the investor because they believe that the firms will 
prioritize the debt payments rather than dividends. Furthermore, empirical 
evidence from this study indicates that debt covenant slack affects investors’ 
decision in using firms’ performance information. However, no statistically 
significant effect was found neither on the relationship between debt covenant 
slack and earnings management nor on the relationship between earnings 
management and the value relevance of accounting information. Hence, 
earnings management is not an intervening variable in the effect of debt 
covenant slack on the value relevance of accounting information. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The effect of the company proximity to the breach of debt covenant on earnings management is explained by the 
debt covenant hypothesis in Positive Accounting Theory proposed by Watts & Zimmerman (1978). The theory predicts 
that when a company is close to its debt covenant violation, the manager tends to increase profits by shifting the 
earnings of the next period to the current period.  
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In explaining and predicting earnings management actions, managers are assumed to be rational and try to 
maximize their utility. On the other hand, in the company, there is also a separation of ownership and management 
functions that give rise to information asymmetry, where managers have more information about the company than 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The implication is that managers will choose accounting policies that are 
more profitable for them. Thus, when a firm is close to the debt covenant violation, the manager will try to make the 
firm’s earnings higher than the actual earnings by moving the earnings from the future period into the current period 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1978).  
The debt covenant hypothesis in positive accounting theory has been confirmed by some empirical evidence 
obtained from Sweeney (1994); Herawati & Baridwan (2007); and Dyreng et al., (2011). All of these studies found 
that managers manage earnings upward when the company violates its debt covenant to avoid the cost of technical 
default (Sweeney, 1994). 
The pattern of earnings management carried out by managers when the firm is close to the breach of the debt 
covenant is not limited to the activity of income increasing only. Empirical studies from DeAngelo et al., (1994) and 
Jha (2013); present findings that management opportunistically manages earnings downward when the company 
violates its debt covenant. Managers prefer to decrease earnings to show that the company is in its financial difficulties 
so the creditors might set less restrictive debt covenants during the renegotiations that follow defaults (DeAngelo et 
al., 1994). 
Several previous studies such as those conducted by Duke & Hunt (1990) and Press & Weintrop (1990), use the 
firms’ debt to equity (DER) ratio to reflect the firms’ closeness to its debt covenant violation. The results of these 
studies indicate that the actual DER is a valid proxy to measure the closeness of a company to its debt covenant 
violation. However, Leftwich (1983), and Kim et al., (2010), claim that the actual DER is not a direct proxy that can 
show how close the firms to their debt covenant violation. Moreover, the use of a single DER actual as a proxy might 
cause problems of interpretation (Leftwich, 1983). Thus, empirical studies of Dichev & Skinner (2002); Kim et al., 
(2010); and Demerjian & Owens (2014), anticipate this problem by using a proxy in the form of “slack”, whose 
calculation includes a threshold (maximum or minimum ratio) required in the firms’ debt agreements with creditors.  
Debt covenant slack is the difference between the threshold value required in the debt covenant with the actual 
value obtained by the company (Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Demerjian & Owens, 2014). The smaller the value of the 
debt covenant slack, the closer the company to the breach of its debt covenant. From the debt covenant hypothesis 
perspectives, it means that companies that tend to do earnings management are those whose value of the debt covenant 
slack tends to be small (Demerjian & Owens, 2014; Kusuma & Yasa, 2019; Dewi et al., 2018). This has been confirmed 
by empirical findings from Kim et al., (2010) and Franz et al., (2014), who found that the debt covenant slack 
negatively affects the earnings management. 
On the other hand, the existence of opportunistic earnings management in the company potentially reduces the 
value relevance of accounting information (Whelan & McNamara, 2004). The value relevance of information 
presented in financial statements is influenced by the investors’ perceptions of the reliability of the information 
presented. Investors are assumed to be rational and sophisticated so that they can detect earnings management. The 
existence of opportunistic earnings management causes the reliability of the information being questioned by investors. 
This is because earnings management causes the information presented by the company in their financial statements 
are no longer reflect the actual performance of the company (not faithfully representative) so that the information will 
not be trusted by investors. Investors might not use such information on their decision making so that the investors’ 
response on that information will not be reflected in the firms’ stock price (Chandrapala, 2013; (Mandala & Astika, 
2019; Sukardi, 2019). Research conducted by Habib (2004); Rahman (2009); Shan (2014); and Mostafa (2017), 
confirmed the evidence obtained by Whelan & McNamara (2004). All of these studies found that earnings management 
has a negative effect on the value relevance of accounting information. 
This study attempts to examine the effect of debt covenant slack on the value relevance of accounting information 
by using earnings management as an intervening variable. A total of 40 companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) during the period 2013 to 2017 were selected through purposive sampling. The adjusted R2 from the 
regression of earnings per share and book value per share on share price is used as the value relevance proxy. Earnings 
management is proxied by the average value of absolute discretionary accruals over the observation period. Debt 
covenant slack is proxied by the average value of DER slack from 2013 to 2017.  
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Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Value Relevance 
 
Historically, the notion about the value relevance of accounting information emerged from the initial event study 
conducted by Ball & Brown (1968), which found that the firms’ earnings have information content and related to the 
firms’ stock price. However, further empirical evidence presented by Lev (1989), indicates that the firms’ earnings 
information can only explain 2-5% variability of company’s stock returns, thereby raising the question about how 
relevant the earnings information for the investor.  
Information is said to be value-relevant if it has an association with equity market value (Barth et al., 2001). 
Typically, the value relevance of accounting information is measured as the adjusted R2 of regression with earning per 
share and book value per share as the independent variables and the stock price as the dependent variable. The statistical 
relation between earnings and book value with the stock price reflects the relevance of accounting information and 
also the consequences of investors’ action (Lev & Zarowin, 1999). The relatively small value of adjusted R2 means 
that the information is less relevant for the investor, vice versa. 
 
Earnings Management 
 
Earnings management occurs when managers use their judgments to take actions that can mislead shareholders 
about company performance (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Generally accepted accounting principle gives the manager 
some flexibility to choose an accounting method to be used in their firms. Managers are assumed to be able to make 
judgments about the most suitable accounting method for the firms. However, managers’ judgments are often 
influenced by certain motivations so that the flexibility is used by managers to act opportunistically by choosing the 
accounting methods that are actually not appropriate to be applied in the firms (Pae, 1999).  
One of the motivations that are said to encourage managers to do earnings management is a violation of firms’ debt 
covenant restrictions. Debt Covenant Hypothesis on the Positive Accounting Theory states that ceteris paribus, the 
closer the firms to the violation of their debt covenant, the more likely the manager manage the firms’ earnings (Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1978). Some empirical studies found that the manager manages earnings upward to relax the tight 
slack so they can avoid technical default (Sweeney, 1994; Herawati & Baridwan, 2007; Dyreng et al., 2011). Other 
empirical evidence found that manager manages earnings downward so that the company appears to be unhealthy, in 
order to get a waiver or less restrictive covenant in their renegotiation with creditors (DeAngelo, 1994; Jha, 2013).  
Debt Covenant Slack 
Generally, the firm’s funding comes from two main sources, i.e. debt from the lenders and equity from the 
shareholders (Frantz, 1997). When the firm borrows from its creditor, their debt agreement usually contains some 
constraint to be fulfilled by the firms, such as the maximum or minimum of certain financial ratio (Janes, 2003). The 
violation of the debt covenant might lead the firms into a technical default which results in some high default cost as 
the consequences. These costs can consist of the increased collateralization, restriction on further borrowing, and 
increased interest rates (Sweeney, 1994).  
The firms’ closeness to its debt covenant violation can be measured by the debt covenant slack. Debt covenant 
slack is the difference between the threshold (maximum or minimum) of the firms’ financial ratio and the actual ratio 
obtained by the firms (Demerjian & Owens, 2014). The lower (tighter) the slack, the closer the firm to its debt covenant 
violation. For the covenant with a maximum threshold, the null and negative value indicates that the firm has violated 
the covenant. 
 
Hypotheses Development 
 
The effect of debt covenant slack on earnings management 
 
Debt covenant hypothesis stated that the closer a firm to its debt covenant violation, the more likely the firms’ 
manager is to select income increasing accounting procedures (Watts & Zimmerman, 1987). Managers try to relax the 
tightness of accounting-based restrictions on the debt agreement, so they can avoid technical default (Sweeney, 1994). 
Moreover, DeAngelo et al., (1994) and Lee (2000), found that when the firms are close to their covenant violation, 
managers are likely to manage the earnings downward to show the firms’ unhealthy financial condition. One 
explanation for this condition is the managers are trying to increase the firms’ bargaining power, so the firms could 
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get waiver from the creditors during renegotiations. Prior empirical evidences from Kim et al., (2010), Jha (2013), and 
Franz et al., (2014), are also found that the debt covenant slack has a negative effect on earnings management.   
Based on the description, this study considers that the smaller (tighter) the debt covenant slack, the more likely the 
firms’ managers manage their earnings opportunistically. Thus, the first hypothesis in this study is stated as follows. 
H1: Debt covenant slack has a negative effect on earnings management. 
 
The effect of earnings management on the value relevance of accounting information 
 
This study assumed that investors are rational and sophisticated so they can detect opportunistic earnings 
management. The existence of earnings management in firms decreases the reliability of the information so it became 
no longer trusted by the investor. An investor might decide not to use such information in making decisions. Thus, the 
information which is contained manipulation becomes less relevant, thereby reducing the explanatory power of such 
information in explaining the stock price (Whelan & McNamara, 2004).  
Empirical studies conducted by Habib (2004); Rahman (2009); Shan (2014); and Mostafa (2017), confirm the evidence 
presented in Whelan & McNamara (2004), by providing empirical evidence that earnings management has a negative 
effect on the value relevance of earnings and book value. Based on the description, this research, therefore, predicts 
that the more likely the firms’ manager manage their earnings opportunistically, the less the value of adjusted R2 
obtained from the regression of earnings and book value on the firms’ share price. Thus, the second hypothesis in this 
study is stated as follows. 
H2: Earnings management has a negative effect on the value relevance of accounting information. 
 
The effect of debt covenant slack on the value relevance of accounting information 
 
Empirical evidence about the effect of debt covenant slack on the value relevance of accounting information has 
not found yet, but another similar study found that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) of firms having lower DER 
tend to be smaller than ERC of firms having higher DER (Dhaliwal et al., 1990; Moradi et al., 2010). One explanation 
is that on the firms which tend to lever by higher debt than equity, the information about the firms’ earnings will be 
more valuable for a creditor because the investor believes that the firms will prioritize their debt payments rather than 
a dividend. Thus, the investor did not use firms’ performance information (earnings and book value) as the basis of 
their decision making, thereby making such information to be less relevant and reduce the explanatory power of that 
information.  
Based on the explanation, this study predicts that the smaller (tighter) the debt covenant slack, the value relevance 
of accounting information i.e. earnings and book value also tends to be small. The small (tight) value of the debt 
covenant slack shows that the firms’ actual DER tends to be high and close to the maximum DER limit or even has 
exceeded the maximum DER required in the debt covenant. In accordance with the empirical evidence presented by 
Dhaliwal et al., (1990) and Moradi et al., (2010), this condition causes the firms’ performance information to be less 
relevant for investors because they perceive that the earnings gained by the firms will be used first to pay the debt. 
Thus, the value relevance of firms’ performance information will tend to be small. The third hypothesis in this study 
is presented as follows. 
H3: Debt covenant slack has a positive effect on the value relevance of accounting information. 
 
 
2.  Materials and Methods 
 
Research Design, Sample, and Data Collection 
 
This study is associative causality research which aims to obtain empirical evidence related to the effect of debt 
covenant slack on the value relevance of accounting information through earnings management as an intervening 
variable. This research was conducted on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The observation period in this study 
was from 2013 to 2017. The population in this study includes all nonfinancial firms listed on the IDX from 2013 to 
2017. A total of 40 samples were collected through purposive sampling with several criteria as follows.  
a) The company belongs to non-financial sector firms listed in IDX over the period 2013 to 2017. Firms belong 
to the financial industry are excluded in this study due to the specific financial characteristics of financial firms 
that are different from firms in another industry (Widowati et al., 2013). 
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b) The company discloses its debt agreement in the notes of financial statements, which contains the maximum 
debt to equity ratio (DER) during 2013 to 2017. 
c) The company publishes its quarterly and annual financial reports for twenty two quarters starting from the third 
quarter of 2013 until the fourth quarter of 2017. 
d) The financial statements contain the data needed in this study which includes the value of liabilities, equity, 
earnings, operating cash flows, total assets, revenue, account receivables, book value, and also the value of 
gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE). 
All the financial data were collected through documents gained from the official website www.idx.co.id and the share 
price data were gained from www.finance.yahoo.co.id. Three hypotheses in this study were tested using PLS (Partial 
Least Square) and analyzed via path analysis. 
 
Variables and measures  
 
1.  Value relevance of accounting information 
This study use the adjusted R2 value from the regression of earnings per share and book value per share on share 
price as a proxy for accounting information’s’ value relevance. To avoid bias, the regression model is deflated by the 
lagged price (Brown et al., 1999) as used by the prior research by Widyatama & Wirama (2018), as follows. 
  
                
                                               (1) 
 
Where 
Pi,t : Adjusted close price share firm from the publication date for quarter t  
Pi,t-1 : Adjusted close price share firm i on the publication date for quarter t-1 
BVPSit  : Book values per share firm i at the end of quarter t 
EPSit    : Earnings per share firm i in quarter t 
εit     : Error term    
 
2.  Debt Covenant Slack 
Debt covenant slack in this study is measured by the average value of DER slack over the period 2013 to 2017. 
Based on Demerjian and Owens (2014), DER slack is measured as follows. 
 
DERslackit = DERmaximumit - DERactualit (2) 
 
Where 
DERslackit : Debt to equity ratio slack of firm i in quarter t 
DERmaximum : Maximum debt to equity ratio required in the debt covenant of firm i in quarter t 
DERactual : Total debt divided by total equity of firm i in quarter t 
 
3.  Earnings management 
This study uses the average value of the absolute discretionary accruals over the period 2013 to 2017 as a proxy of 
earnings management. The absolute value were used to avoid bias in the interpretation which is tend to interpret 
negative discretionary accrual as lower earnings management than the positive ones. To estimate discretionary 
accruals, this study use the version of Modified Jones Model presented by Dechow et al., (1995), which is described 
as follows. 
TAit = Earningsit – CFOit (3) 
TAit / Ait-1 = α1(1/ Ait-1) + α2 (ΔREVit / Ait-1) + α3 (PPEit / Ait-1) + εit (4) 
NDAit = α1(1/Ait-1) + α2(ΔREVit /Ait-1 - ΔRECit /Ait-1) + α3(PPEit /Ait-1) (5)  
DAit = (TAit / Ait-1) - NDAit (6) 
Where 
TAit : total accruals firm i in quarter t 
Earningsit : net earnings firm i in quarter t 
CFOit : cash flows from operating activities firm i in quarter t 
A it-1 : total assets firm i at t-1 
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ΔREVit : revenues firm i in quarter t less revenues firm i in quarter t-1 
ΔRECit : net receivables firm i in quarter t less net receivables in quarter t-1 
PPEit : gross property, plant, and equipment firm i in quarter t 
NDAit :  non discretionary accruals firm i in quarter t 
α : firm spesific parameter 
εit : eror term 
 
Data Analysis Technique 
Data were analyzed through path analysis using Partial Least Square. On the hypothesis testing, this study uses one 
tailed testing because all the hypotheses in this study use sign (positive/ negative). To determine whether the variables 
relation are significant or not, we compared the p-value with the significant level (0,05). The relation are considered 
to be significant if the p-value is smaller than 0,05. On the contrary, the relation is considered to be not significant if 
the p-value is greater than 0,05. 
 
 
3.  Results and Discussions 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
There are three variables in this study, i.e. debt covenant slack (X1), earnings management (X2), and value relevance 
(Y). The results of descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows that for the entire sample, debt covenant slack has a minimum value of -4,350 and a maximum value of 
2,676. The mean value of this variable is 0,959. The standard deviation is 1,291 which are greater than the mean value. 
This means that on average, the variability of debt covenant slack value for the entire samples are relatively high. 
Earnings management proxies by the absolute discretionary accrual have a minimum and maximum value of 0,014 
and 0,836, respectively. The mean value of this variable is 0,959 and the standard deviation is 0,187 which are lower 
than the mean value. This means that on average, the variability of earnings management for the entire samples are 
relatively low. Value relevance has a minimum value of -0.089 and a maximum value of 0,595. The mean value is 
0,147 and the standard deviation is 0,184 which are greater than the mean value. This means that on average, the 
variability of earnings management for the entire samples are relatively high. 
 
Hypothesis Testing and Discussions 
Three hypotheses were tested using the Partial Least Square (PLS) approach and the results are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Result of Hypothesis Testing 
 
Hypothesis Coefficient t statistic p value Result 
H1 0,128 0,828 0,204 Not Significant (Rejected) 
H2 -0,227 1,335 0,091 Not Significant (Rejected) 
H3 0,276 2,011 0,022 Significant (Confirmed) 
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Debt Covenant Slack (X1) 40 -4,350 2,676 0,959 1,291 
Earnings Management (X2) 40 0,014 0,836 0,188 0,187 
Value Relevance  
(Y) 
40 
-0,089 0,595 0,147 0,184 
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According to Table 2, the result did not support the first hypothesis (H1) because the p-value is 0,204 which are greater 
than 0,05. Hence, H1 is rejected, means that earnings management in the sample firms is not influenced by the firms’ 
debt covenant slack.  
This result does not confirm the debt covenant hypothesis, as well as the prior empirical evidence presented in 
Dyreng et al., (2011); Kim et al., (2010); Jha (2013); and Franz et al., (2014), which stated that the closeness of a firm 
to their debt covenant violations affect the earnings management. One that could be among the reason based on the 
data collected in this study is among the total of 40 sample firms, only four firms that had been violated the debt 
covenant (has negative slack), while the other empirical studies used the relatively similar amount between firms which 
are already in debt covenant violation and firms which are close to their debt covenant violation. 
On the other hand, this finding is in line with the empirical evidence presented in Chung & Kallapur (2003); Jao & 
Pagalung (2011); and Ardison et al., (2012). Jao & Pagalung (2011), stated that this condition might occur if the 
managers believe that earnings management is not the best way to do to avoid the violation of the firms’ debt covenant. 
Research conducted by Dyreng (2007), found that the manager takes into account the cost of earnings management 
and so as the cost of debt covenant violation in deciding whether they will manage earnings or not. The evidence shows 
that the manager manages firms’ earnings only if the cost of earnings management is lower than the cost of debt 
covenant violation. Managing earnings may lead the firms into some consequences including increasing regulatory 
scrutiny (Dechow et al., 1996), increasing the likelihood of shareholder litigation (Skinner, 1996), increasing taxable 
income (Dyreng, 2007), and sacrificing the real performance of the firm (Graham et al., 2004). 
Based on Table 2 we can find that the result also did not support the second hypothesis (H2) because the twenty-
two (0,091) is greater than 0,05. Hence, H2 is rejected, means that the value relevance of firms’ accounting information 
in this study did not affect by the earnings management which occurs in the firms. This finding is contrary to the prior 
empirical evidence presented by Whelan & McNamara (2004); Habib (2004); Rahman (2009); Shan (2014); and 
Mostafa (2017), which found that earnings management has a negative effect on the value relevance of accounting 
information. 
We have not found any prior empirical studies which obtained similar finding yet. But the study presented by Healy 
& Wahlen (1999), found that earnings management activities occurred in the firms do not always influence the 
investors' decisions in using information about the firms' performance, earnings and book value. This is possible 
because investors consider earnings management is not pervasive. Investors are aware to the existence of earnings 
management because it can distort the firms’ performance information, so that investors may make a decision that 
should not be made based on such information (Pae, 1999). However, if the investors consider that earnings 
management does not exceed the limits tolerated by them, they will still use the firms’ performance information to 
predict the prospects of the firms (Kwag & Stephens, 2010). 
Table 2 also reported strong support for the third hypothesis (H3), indicated by the p-value (0,022) which is lower 
than 0,05. This means that the firms’ debt covenant slack positively affect the value relevance of the firms’ accounting 
information. This finding supports the empirical evidence from previous studies with similar topics conducted by 
Dhaliwal et al., (1990) and Moradi et al., (2010), which found that the greater the debt to equity ratio, the value 
relevance of firms' accounting information tends to be small. 
This study found that the debt covenant slacks positively affect the investors’ decision in using firms performance 
information i.e. earnings and book value. The smaller (tighter) the firms’ debt covenant slack indicates that the firms’ 
debt to equity ratio is relatively high. As stated by Dhaliwal et al., (1990), this condition causes the information of 
firms’ performance to be less relevant for the investor because they will perceive that manager will prioritize the debt 
payment to the creditor rather than paying a dividend to the investor. Thus, the investor will not use the information to 
make a decision, thereby making the firms performance information loses its relevance. 
 
The Intervening Role (Mediation Effect) of Earnings Management  
 
This study did not find the mediation effect of earnings management on the effect of debt covenant slack on the 
value relevance of accounting information. This is because the debt covenant slack (as the independent variable) does 
not affect earnings management (as the variable which presumed as an intervening variable) and earnings management 
does not affect the value relevance of accounting information (dependent variable). 
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4.  Conclusion 
 
This study did not find evidence supported the debt covenant hypothesis and previous empirical evidence that the 
debt covenant violations negatively affect earnings management. This study also did not obtain any empirical evidence 
in line with previous research which found that earnings management negatively affects the value relevance of 
accounting information. 
On the other hand, this study found that the firms’ debt covenant slack positively affect the value relevance of its 
accounting information. Thus, we can conclude that the information about the firms’ debt covenant slack is also being 
a consideration of investors in deciding whether to use information about firms’ performance or not. This finding can 
lead to a suggestion for managers to maintain the firms’ financial ratios appropriately in order to not to close or 
exceeded the maximum or minimum ratio required on their debt covenant with the creditors. 
This study is limited in its small number of samples because of the use of value relevance proxies. Therefore, 
further research with a similar topic may utilize the other proxy to measure the value relevance of accounting 
information. 
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